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I. INTRODUCTION 
One evening, Qua found what she believed was a Kylie Lip Kit on Facebook 
Marketplace.1 Usually, the Kylie Lip Kit includes a lipstick and a matching 
lipliner.2 Eager to obtain the coveted cult makeup and thinking she was receiving 
a good deal, Qua purchased the kit from Facebook Marketplace since it was sold 
out everywhere else.3 Upon receiving the kit in the mail, Qua excitedly removed 
the lipstick from its packaging and immediately applied the product to her lips.4 
Moments later, Qua could not open her mouth.5 The lipstick superglued her lips 
shut.6 It was at this time that Qua realized she purchased a counterfeit lip kit.7 
The sale of counterfeit items is a $1.2 trillion industry, contributing to a $30.3 
billion loss for luxury fashion brands such as Louis Vuitton and Gucci.8 While 
brands continue to face increasing losses, the quantity of counterfeit goods entering 
the market continues to increase because counterfeiters no longer need to hide in 
the shadows or deal in back-alley transactions.9 E-commerce sites like Amazon 
and eBay, which are commonly considered marketplaces, allow counterfeit 
suppliers to sell their products virtually anonymously.10 However, counterfeit 
goods are not exclusively sold in traditional online marketplaces.11 Over the last 
few years, counterfeiters started leveraging social media sites, like Instagram, to 
increase their reach to consumers.12 A quick online search of any e-commerce or 
social media site reveals a range of counterfeit goods, from fake Nikes, Adidas 
Yeezys, and Rolex watches to more harmful items like counterfeit prescription 
 
1.  BROKEN: MAKEUP MAYHEM (Netflix 2019). 
2.  See KYLIE COSMETICS, https://www.kyliecosmetics.com/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2019) (on file with the 
University of the Pacific Law Review) (selecting “lips”, then “matte lipstick kits” from the “shop” tab and finding 
each lip kit includes one lipstick and one lipliner). 
3.  BROKEN: MAKEUP MAYHEM, supra note 1.  
4.  Id. 
5.  Id. 
6.  Id. 
7.  Id. 
8.  Chavie Lieber, Instagram Has a Counterfeit Fashion Problem, VOX (May 2, 2019), 
https://www.vox.com/the-goods/2019/5/2/18527181/instagram-counterfeit-industry-chanel-gucci-louis-vuitton 
(on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review). 
9.  Lieber, supra note 8.  
10.  Id. 
11.  Id. 
12.  See id. (discussing counterfeit fashion accounts contributed 65 million posts to Instagram). 
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medication, e-cigarettes, and makeup.13 Counterfeit makeup is particularly harmful 
to consumers because of the inferior and hazardous ingredients counterfeiters use 
to replicate high-cost legitimate alternatives.14 
The increasing sale and distribution of counterfeit products can be harmful to 
consumers, but it is also troublesome to the intellectual property (“IP”) owners, 
who own the trademarks on such products.15 As counterfeit goods flood online 
marketplaces, IP owners face an impossible battle of policing and regulating their 
marks.16 Agencies and IP owners often describe it as a “whack-a-mole” problem: 
when websites or IP owners remove one infringing seller, ten more “pop up” in 
that seller’s place.17 Additionally, an IP owner has the nearly impossible task of 
enforcing its rights against the direct infringer—the one that manufactures or sells 
the counterfeit item—since the majority of counterfeiters produce their goods in 
China.18 
In some cases, the IP owner attempts to hold the intermediary or online service 
provider (“OSP”) liable under the theory of contributory trademark infringement.19 
Unlike direct trademark infringement, which holds an individual liable for 
engaging in infringing activities, contributory trademark infringement holds a 
person or entity liable for encouraging or contributing to those persons that engage 
in infringing activity.20 However, after the Second Circuit’s 2010 decision in 
Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., the general belief is that OSPs are not contributorily 
liable for their users’ direct trademark infringement unless they possess actual 
knowledge of specific instances of infringement.21 
Although the reasoning from Tiffany remains, there is inconsistency amongst 
the circuits as to what information an OSP must know to satisfy the actual 
knowledge requirement.22 The Supreme Court had an opportunity to address the 
 
13.  BROKEN: MAKEUP MAYHEM, supra note 1; see Lieber, supra note 8 (identifying the majority of 
counterfeit accounts focus on selling luxury fashion knockoffs and even finding an account posted a video of 
counterfeit Adidas Yeezy sneakers at the manufacturing facility).  
14.  BROKEN: MAKEUP MAYHEM, supra note 1; see Intellectual Property: CBP Can Enhance Information 
Sharing with the Private Sector to Address Changes in the Counterfeits Market, Testimony Before the S. Comm. 
on Fin., 115th Cong. 7–8 (2018) [hereinafter Intellectual Property: CBP] (statement of Kim Gianopoulos, 
Director, International Affairs and Trade) (noting many counterfeit goods were found to contain dangerous 
chemical levels and hazardous substances). 
15.  See Intellectual Property: CBP, supra note 14, at 2, 7 (explaining the private sector is facing increased 
difficulty in investigating counterfeit goods). 
16.  Id. 
17.  See BROKEN: MAKEUP MAYHEM, supra note 1 (explaining that lack of a strong punishment contributes 
to the problem). 
18.  Intellectual Property: CBP, supra note 14, at 2, 3. 
19.  See generally Irene Calboli, Contributory Trademark Infringement on the Internet: Shouldn’t 
Intermediaries Finally Know What They Need to “Know” and “Control?”, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE LAW 211, 213–20 (John A. Rothchild ed., 2016) (reviewing the evolution of the 
contributory trademark infringement doctrine through relevant cases). 
20.  Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982). 
21.  Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1082 (2010). 
22.  See Calboli, supra note 19, at 211, 212 (claiming the courts use a “‘we know it when we see it’ 
approach”). 
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confusion, but declined to hear this issue.23 Since the Lanham Act does not provide 
requirements to hold an individual or an entity liable for contributory trademark 
infringement, OSPs and intermediaries are left with very little guidance,.24 The 
concepts of secondary liability and contributory infringement developed as 
common law doctrines, borrowing much of the reasoning from copyright cases.25 
Even though the Supreme Court has yet to address the issue, post-Tiffany cases 
highlight the theme that courts do not truly recognize OSPs’ knowledge.26 In all 
the cases, courts seemingly choose to ignore or not give substantial weight to the 
fact that when counterfeit sales occur, OSPs collect data on each listing or posting 
and use that data to run their businesses.27 
This Comment proposes that, due to advancements in technology, there is a 
gap in the Tiffany standard for finding an OSP liable for contributory trademark 
infringement because the data OSPs collect should raise their level of knowledge 
to “actual knowledge” under the current standard.28 After establishing there is 
potential liability for OSPs under the current standard, this Comment aims to 
provide safety to OSPs while also addressing the enforcement needs of IP 
owners.29 To encourage OSPs to help IP owners police their marks and protect 
consumers, Congress should amend the Lanham Act or enact new legislation to 
create a safe harbor for OSPs.30 In the interim, because law often trails technology, 
this Comment proposes that a federal agency spearhead a private agreement 
between OSPs and IP owners.31 
Part II primes the discussion of contributory trademark infringement by 
discussing trademark law in general.32 Part III addresses social media’s growth and 
contribution to a counterfeit culture—highlighting the “social media influencer” 
sector as being particularly at risk—and provides a basic overview of the 
technological infrastructure that courts should consider when evaluating 
contributory trademark infringement cases.33 Part IV reviews the leading case, 
Tiffany v. eBay, and its standard for determining contributory trademark 
 
23.  Tiffany (NJ) Inc., 600 F.3d at 93. 
24.  Calboli, supra note 19, at 212–13. 
25.  See generally id. at 211 (reviewing the facts of each case and highlighting that each analysis relies on 
whether OSPs received physical notice of the infringement). 
26.  See id. at 211, 212 (claiming the courts use a “‘we know it when we see it’ approach”). 
27.  See id. (explaining courts seem hesitant to interpret the standard too narrowly so that it will not stifle 
legitimate business activities); Bernard Marr, The Amazing Ways Instagram Uses Big Data and Artificial 
Intelligence, FORBES (Mar. 16, 2018, 12:28 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2018/03/16/the-
amazing-ways-instagram-uses-big-data-and-artificial-intelligence/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law 
Review) (explaining how Instagram incorporates data into its decision making). 
28.  Infra Section V.B. 
29.  Infra Part VI. 
30.  Infra Parts V–VI. 
31.  Infra Section VI.B. 
32.  Infra Part II. 
33.  Infra Part III. 
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infringement.34 Part V highlights the gap in the Tiffany knowledge standard and 
discusses why courts should place a heavier emphasis on OSPs’ technology when 
deciding whether an OSP meets such a standard.35 Finally, Part VI proposes 
amending the Lanham Act or enacting new legislation to include safe harbor 
provisions with proactive requirements for OSPs, or as an alternative to legislation 
in the interim, proposes a private agreement between OSPs and IP owners.36 
II. TRADEMARK LAW 
IP is “a commercially valuable product of human intellect.”37 Generally, there 
are four categories of IP: trademarks, copyright, patents, and trade secrets.38 Article 
I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution secures the rights of copyright and patent 
holders by articulating Congress’ right “to promote the Progress of Science and 
Useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”39 While this Comment focuses 
solely on trademarks, having background knowledge of copyright law is helpful to 
understand the legal principles courts borrow from copyright law and apply in 
trademark cases.40 Section A presents the most relevant copyright law to this 
Comment titled the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”).41 Section B 
provides a general background of trademark law.42 Section C explores how the 
production and sale of counterfeit goods is a violation of trademark law.43 
A. The DMCA 
Congress enacted the DMCA in 1998.44 As a signatory to the World 
Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty, the U.S. needed to implement 
legal remedies to protect copyrighted works in the modern technological age.45 The 
rise of the Internet and developments in technology allowed infringers to 
circumvent technological measures copyright owners used to prevent illegal 
 
34.  Infra Part IV. 
35.  Infra Part V. 
36.  Infra Part VI. 
37.  Intellectual Property, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
38.  PETER S. MENELL, MARK A. LEMLEY & ROBERT P. MERGES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW 
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE: 2019, at 31 (2019). 
39.  U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. 
40.  Infra Parts II–VI; see Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010), cert denied, 562 U.S. 
1082 (2010) (explaining the Supreme Court’s observations of the Inwood standard in relation to a copyright case 
were persuasive). 
41.  Infra Section II.A. 
42.  Infra Section II.B. 
43.  Infra Section II.C. 
44.  17 U.S.C.A. § 512 (West 2020). 
45.  GARY MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 149 (2017). 
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copying.46 Internet service providers (“ISPs”) grew concerned about the 
foreseeable liability their companies faced by users utilizing their services to copy 
and distribute unauthorized works.47 As a response to ISPs’ concerns, the DMCA 
created a set of safe harbors to limit “service providers” liability for infringing 
works.48 The DMCA identified four kinds of ISP activity where an ISP, if in 
compliance with DMCA requirements, may invoke a safe harbor provision: (a) 
“transitory digital network communications,” (b) system caching, (c) “information 
residing on systems or networks at direction of users,” and (d) information location 
tools.49 The third category of activity referencing information residing on networks 
at the direction of users establishes the notice-and-takedown (“NTD”) procedure.50 
A copyright owner uses an NTD to inform ISPs of suspected infringing material.51 
B. Trademark Law Foundation 
Unlike copyrights and patents which belong under the exclusive jurisdiction 
of the federal law, both federal and state law govern trademarks.52 Congress 
created the first federal trademark law in the late 1800s, enacting the law under the 
right to regulate interstate commerce.53 Trademark law has continued to expand 
since its inception in the 1800s.54 The Lanham Act is the main federal statute that 
regulates trademarks.55 It defines a trademark as a “word, symbol, or device used 
by a person, or which a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce” to 
distinguish his or her products and goods from others.56 Trademarks protect 
consumers because they allow consumers to make informed purchases by assuring 
them that the products they buy are what those products purport to be.57 On the 
other hand, trademarks incentivize manufacturers to produce high-quality 
products.58 
Trademarks also aim to create goodwill.59 As such, trademark owners work 
hard to establish their mark and to build customer trust.60 Some marks are easy to 
 
46.  Id. 
47.  MARY LAFRANCE, COPYRIGHT LAW IN A NUTSHELL 416 (2017). 
48.  Id. at 417; 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(k)(1)(A) (West 2020) (defining the term “service provider” as “a provider 
of online services or network access, or the operator of facilities therefor”). 
49.  17 U.S.C.A. § 512(a)–(d) (West 2020). 
50.  Id. at § 512(c). 
51.  Id. 
52.  MENELL, LEMLEY & MERGES, supra note 38, at 38. 
53.  Id. at 874. 
54.  See id. (highlighting the changes to the Lanham Act throughout the years). 
55.  Id. 
56.  The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127 (West 2020). 
57.  MENELL, LEMLEY & MERGES, supra note 38, at 873. 
58.  Id. at 877. 
59.  Id. 
60.  Id. 
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recognize such as “Nike,” Nike’s “swoosh,” “Coca-Cola,” or “Tide.”61 However, 
even if a large population does not recognize a mark, the mark can still earn 
protection.62 Trademark owners can protect their marks so long as the mark is 
capable of identifying the source of the product.63 
Once trademark owners establish that they have a valid trademark,64 they have 
the right to prevent others from using that mark.65 In the event a person or 
organization unlawfully uses an owner’s mark, the Lanham Act allows a party to 
sue for trademark infringement.66 If a party uses a trademark that creates a 
likelihood of confusion in the mind of consumers as to the source or sponsorship 
of the goods, that party’s use constitutes direct infringement.67 However, over time, 
courts extended several secondary liability theories such as contributory liability 
and vicarious liability to trademarks—even though the Lanham Act does not 
expressly provide for such claims.68 Contributory infringement occurs when a third 
party assists, induces, or continues supplying its service or product to someone it 
knows is directly infringing another’s mark.69 There are other relevant theories of 
liability such as trademark dilution but this Comment focuses primarily on 
contributory infringement.70 
C. The Connection Between Counterfeit Goods and Trademark Law 
Counterfeiting is a form of trademark infringement.71 A person counterfeits an 
item by making a copy or imitating an item without authorization and attempts to 
pass the copy off as the genuine product.72 On the spectrum of copied items, there 
are those that display/affix a famous trademark to an item to appear as if the item 
is genuine.73 Alternatively, there are “dupes” or “knock-offs”—i.e., items that are 
similar in appearance to the genuine item but do not include the inspired item’s 
 
61.  See Overview of Trademark Law, BERKMAN KLEIN CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y AT HARV. U., 
https://cyber.harvard.edu/metaschool/fisher/domain/tm.htm (last visited Jan. 8, 2020) (on file with the University 
of the Pacific Law Review) (providing examples of easily recognized trademarks). 
62.  See id. (explaining the prerequisites any mark must meet to establish the mark as a trademark). 
63.  Id. 
64.  See id. (describing that a trademark owner establishes a valid trademark by proving either she was the 
first to register the mark with the USPTO or she used the mark first in commerce). 
65.  Id. 
66.  The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1114 (West 2020). 
67.  15 U.S.C.A. § 1114(1)(a)–(b). 
68.  See Calboli, supra note 19, at 211, 213 (summarizing the courts’ development of contributory 
trademark infringement through various decisions). 
69.  Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982). 
70.  Infra Parts IV–VI. 
71.  15 U.S.C.A. § 1114(1)(a). 
72.  Arthur Zaczkiewicz, Counterfeits, Knockoffs, Replicas: Parsing the Legal Implications, WOMEN’S 
WEAR DAILY (June 2, 2016), https://wwd.com/business-news/retail/counterfeit-knockoff-replica-legal-
10437109/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review). 
73.  Id. 
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mark.74 Both instances of copying intend to benefit from the goodwill of the 
genuine items’ mark; however, the sale of dupes is not always trademark 
infringement, while the sale of counterfeits is always trademark infringement.75 
In addition to violating trademark laws, trafficking counterfeit goods into the 
United States is a federal crime.76 For repeat offenders, the law imposes a fine up 
to fifteen million dollars or twenty years imprisonment.77 Additionally, at the state 
level, all states have some type of law addressing counterfeit goods.78 California 
makes it illegal for any person who “willfully manufactures, intentionally sells, or 
knowingly possesses for sale any counterfeit mark.”79 Even with the current laws 
in force, the sale of counterfeit goods nevertheless continues to increase.80 
III. SOCIAL MEDIA GROWTH AND THE RISE OF THE “COUNTERFEIT CULTURE” 
One of the foremost contributions to increasing sales of counterfeit goods is 
the growth of social media.81 Social media includes “websites [or] applications that 
enable users to create and share content or to participate in social networking.”82 
In 2005, only 5% of adults said they used social media.83 In contrast, 72% of people 
today admit to using a social media site.84 YouTube and Facebook are among the 
most popular.85 In 2019, approximately seven-in-ten adults reported using 
Facebook, with more than half of them visiting the site daily.86 However, younger 
demographics gravitate towards more image-forward sites like Instagram and 
Snapchat.87 Among the eighteen to twenty-four year old demographic, 
approximately 75% use Instagram.88 
 
74.  Id. 
75.  Id. 
76.  The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1114(1)(a) (West 2020); 18 U.S.C.A. § 2320(a) (West 2020). 
77.  18 U.S.C.A. § 2320(b)(1)(B). 
78.  Jeremy M. Wilson et al., Product Counterfeiting Legislation in the United States: A Review and 
Assessment of Characteristics, Remedies, and Penalties, J. Crim. L. & Criminology 521, 535 (2016). 
79.  CAL. PENAL CODE § 350(a) (West 2020). 
80.  See BROKEN: MAKEUP MAYHEM, supra note 1 (explaining current laws are ineffective at thwarting 
counterfeiting). 
81.  See INT’L TRADEMARK ASSOC., ADDRESSING THE SALE OF COUNTERFEITS ON THE INTERNET 8 (2017) 
(stating the sale of counterfeit goods on social media has “risen alarmingly”). 
82.  Social Media, LEXICO, https://www.lexico.com/definition/social_media (last visited Jan. 6, 2020) (on 
file with the University of the Pacific Law Review). 
83.  Brooke Auxier, Monica Anderson & Madhu Kumar, 10 Tech-Related Trends That Shaped the Decade, 
PEW RES. CENT. (Dec. 20, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/12/20/10-tech-related-trends-that-
shaped-the-decade/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review). 
84.  Id. 
85.  Andrew Perrin & Monica Anderson, Share of U.S. Adults Using Social Media, Including Facebook, Is 
Mostly Unchanged Since 2018, PEW RES. CENT. (Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2019/04/10/share-of-u-s-adults-using-social-media-including-facebook-is-mostly-unchanged-since-2018/ 
(on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review). 
86.  Id. 
87.  Id. 
88.  Id. 
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Over the last ten years, social media use has grown significantly partly because 
of the increase in mobile connectivity and the ease of access to smartphones.89 In 
fact, only 35% of adults admitted to having a smartphone in 2011; today, 
approximately 81% own a smartphone.90 Section A discusses the development of 
social media sites and their broadening purpose and use.91 Section B explores the 
changing trends in buying and selling counterfeit goods.92 Section C presents the 
problem of policing counterfeit goods on social media sites by discussing the 
tension between the technology, the current legal standard, and the relevant 
stakeholders.93 
A. Development of Social Media 
In the beginning, social media sites like Myspace and Facebook served a more 
limited purpose than they do today.94 The sites expanded upon early day social 
media which focused on message boards and providing people a place to 
communicate and share with others.95 Today, in addition to building a network and 
communicating with friends, social media sites serve many purposes.96 For 
example, social networks now serve as primary mediums for news, surpassing 
delivery by print-media in 2018.97 Even more relevant than serving as a key 
medium for news is that social media has created a new industry—social media 
influencing.98 Individuals are “influencers” because they influence others to 
purchase a product by making that product look enticing, often by wearing or using 
the product.99 
The influencer is replacing many traditional methods of advertisement.100 
Instead of a brand like Nike purchasing a TV commercial on a major television 
network, it will contract with an influencer to post a picture and a caption, 
 
89.  Auxier, Anderson & Kumar, supra note 83. 
90.  Id. 
91.  Infra Section III.A. 
92.  Infra Section III.B. 
93.  Infra Section III.C. 
94.  See Matthew Jones, The Complete History of Social Media: A Timeline of the Invention of Online 
Networking, HIST. COOPERATIVE (June 16, 2015), https://historycooperative.org/the-history-of-social-media/ (on 
file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (discussing how blogging in the early 1990s was a way for 
persons to express their feelings and thoughts on the Internet). 
95.  See id. (reviewing the functions of the first social media platforms). 
96.  See Auxier, Anderson & Kumar, supra note 83 (noting, as an example, that social media is used for 
activism). 
97.  Katherine Schaeffer, U.S. Has Changed in Key Ways in the Past Decade, from Tech Use to 
Demographics, PEW RES. CENT. (Dec. 20, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/12/20/key-ways-
us-changed-in-past-decade/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review). 
98.  Mark Goodrich & Jason Howell, Influencers: What Every Brand and Legal Counsel Should Know, 11 
LANDSLIDE 15 (2018) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review). 
99.  Id. 
100.  Id. 
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commonly referred to as “content.”101 The brand benefits from this form of 
advertisement because by picking an influencer whose audience (i.e., the 
influencer’s “followers”) is within a desired demographic, the brand’s product or 
service reaches consumers in an authentic (because the follower trusts the 
influencer’s referral), more direct, and immediate manner.102 
Another channel of income for influencers is through affiliate marketing or 
product referrals.103 An influencer posts content and creates links corresponding to 
each product.104 When a person purchases the product through the link or with a 
specific purchase code, the influencer makes a commission.105 Intermediary 
websites, like “liketoknow.it,” help influencers facilitate the sale of these 
products.106 The intermediary supplies the software which creates the hyperlinks 
that facilitate the purchase of these goods.107 Additionally, the intermediary creates 
a centralized location on its website for the sale of these products by directing an 
“influencer’s” followers to the liketoknow.it website or mobile application.108 
Once inside the liketoknow.it application, the user then selects the item she wants 
to purchase, and the intermediary redirects her to the store’s website that actually 
sells the product.109 
B. Changing Trends in Counterfeit Goods 
Ever-developing technology paired with “influencer culture” is increasing the 
supply of and demand for counterfeit goods.110 Consumer behavior relating to how 
and where consumers buy products also contributes to increasing sales of 
counterfeit goods.111 For example, in the beauty industry, new independent 
companies (“indie brands”) are changing the traditional distribution methods of 
 
101.  Paris Martineau, The Wired Guide to Influencers, WIRED (Dec. 06, 2019, 10:00 AM), 
https://www.wired.com/story/what-is-an-influencer/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review); see 
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platforms). 
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beauty products by utilizing social media to quickly grow their companies through 
a direct-to-consumer (“DTC”) business model.112 DTC businesses increase profit 
margins and speed up production timelines by interacting directly with the 
customer instead of utilizing an intermediary to store and sell products.113 
Additionally, these indie makeup brands are experiencing rapid growth by 
using scarcity marketing tactics and leveraging the social media influencer culture 
to build excitement around their products.114 By launching “exclusive collections” 
with “limited productions,” indie brands rely on scarcity marketing tactics to 
generate fear in consumers that they will be unable to obtain the product in the 
future.115 Customers fear if they do not purchase the product immediately upon 
release, there will never be another opportunity.116 In some instances, people’s 
desire for the coveted exclusive product leads them to purchase counterfeit goods 
just like Qua.117 
These social media marketing tactics are helping to grow a “counterfeit 
culture.”118 This growing “counterfeit culture” increases the demand for 
counterfeit goods.119 In some cases, the influencer unintentionally encourages 
others to purchase counterfeit goods by posting content including the legitimate 
item.120 In other instances, influencers purposely encourage and benefit from 
others purchasing counterfeit goods by directly linking infringing items, 
oftentimes to online marketplaces like Amazon, and making a commission.121 
C. Policing Counterfeits on Social Media 
On the liketoknow.it app, no button exists for a user to report suspicious 
content, and the only reference to reporting infringing content is in the Terms of 
Service, which provides an email address for direct complaints.122 However, in the 
wake of Tiffany v. eBay, and under the belief that OSPs are liable for contributory 
trademark infringement only if they have “actual” knowledge, the lack of reporting 
mechanisms is unsurprising.123 Yet the idea that social media sites do not have 
actual knowledge of trademark infringing items until someone reports a specific 
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item is confusing for one reason—data.124 
Social media sites aggregate data they collect from users’ submissions and 
interactions for a variety of business functions, such as targeted advertising, 
informing preference algorithms, and improving the overall “user experience.”125 
Social media sites know a user’s age, name, location, what the user’s face looks 
like, who the user has communicated with, how many times the user has logged 
into the application, and more.126 A social media company knows this information 
by collecting and analyzing the data of each user, including but not limited to: user-
submitted content, shares, likes, comments, mentions, website cookies, and 
metadata.127 
Metadata is “data that provide[s] information about data.”128 One of the most 
commonly known forms of metadata is the hashtag.129 Hashtags connect a piece of 
content with a topic or theme.130 In the counterfeit context, a seller of a counterfeit 
good may post a picture of the good with the hashtag of the name of the authentic 
good or a hashtag signaling the good is inauthentic.131 Any user who searches the 
same hashtag will be able to locate the posting of a counterfeit good, follow the 
directions the picture includes, and purchase the item.132 More often, the 
description describes these items as authentic items for resale, confusing less-
savvy consumers who merely think they are receiving a bargain.133 
Even though it appears easy to identify sellers of counterfeit goods, the concept 
of hashtags underscores the primary argument of social media sites that not all 
users utilizing hashtags to sell items do so illegally.134 The first-sale doctrine states 
that IP owners cannot enforce their rights after the initial sale of a legitimate 
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good.135 Since the first-sale doctrine protects genuine resale of goods, OSPs argue 
they lack the ability to discern between legitimate sellers of genuine goods and 
illegitimate sellers of counterfeit goods without receiving notice of a specific 
infringing item.136 Therefore, according to these OSPs, they merely have “general 
knowledge” of infringing goods sold on their sites and are not liable under the 
current standard.137 
IV. TIFFANY (NJ) INC. V. EBAY, INC.: SECOND CIRCUIT DECIDES THE FATE OF 
OSPS? 
Tort law provides the legal principles that comprise the common law doctrine 
of contributory trademark infringement.138 Tiffany provides the current standard 
for when the law may hold an OSP liable for contributory trademark 
infringement.139 Section A briefly reviews Inwood Labs. Inc. v. Ives Labs. Inc., 
Tiffany’s predecessor and the last time the Supreme Court addressed contributory 
trademark infringement.140 Section B addresses extending Inwood to service 
providers in Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Networks Solutions, Inc.141 Finally, Section 
C discusses the facts in Tiffany and the prevailing rule from the case.142 
A. Inwood Labs. Inc. v. Ives Labs. Inc. 
The United States Supreme Court last addressed the concept of contributory 
trademark infringement in 1982 when it granted certiorari to a case from the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals.143 In the case, the Supreme Court considered 
whether generic drug manufacturers were liable for trademark infringement for 
manufacturing a drug with the same coloring and shape of a patented and 
trademark protected brand-name drug.144 Ives Labs held a patent on the drug 
cyclandelate, which it used to treat cerebral vascular diseases and sold under the 
 
135.  See MENELL, LEMLEY & MERGES, supra note 38, at 1103 (explaining the defense of exhaustion/first 
sale to trademark infringement). 
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goods). 
137.  See Tiffany (NJ) Inc., 600 F.3d at 107 (arguing generalized knowledge of counterfeit goods sold on 
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139.  Id. at 107. 
140.  Infra Section IV.A. 
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142.  Infra Section IV.C. 
143.  Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982). 
144.  Id. at 846. 
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trademark “Cyclospasmol.”145 After the patent expired, generic drug 
manufacturers produced the drug in an identical color and shape as Cyclospasmol 
and marketed the drug to pharmacies as the brand-name drug equivalent.146 Ives 
claimed that, due to the similar appearance, using look-alike capsules, and similar 
catalog entries, pharmacists and druggists dispensed the generic drugs—either 
mistakenly or purposely—as the brand-name drugs.147 Further, Ives contended the 
generic manufacturers confused consumers by manufacturing generic drugs to 
look the same as the brand-name counterparts.148 On appeal, the Second Circuit 
reversed the district court’s decision, finding the generic drug manufacturers 
violated § 32 of the Lanham Act.149 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit’s decision.150 The 
Supreme Court determined the district court applied the correct standard that the 
law may hold a manufacturer contributorily liable for infringement when “a 
manufacturer or distributor intentionally induces another to infringe a trademark, 
or if it continues to supply its product to one whom it knows or has reason to know 
is engaging in trademark infringement.”151 The standard establishes two avenues 
down which to show contributory trademark infringement.152 Under one avenue, a 
manufacturer or distributor may be liable if they induce infringement.153 Under the 
other avenue, liability rests on whether the manufacturer “knows or has reason to 
know” of the infringement.154 On appeal, the Supreme Court did not need to define 
the standard further; it simply found an error in the circuit court’s judgment 
because that court did not apply the correct standard of review.155 
While the majority did not further define the standard, Justice Byron White, in 
his concurring opinion, offered insight into what should qualify under the second 
“knows or has reason to know” prong.156 Justice White asserted that mere 
anticipation of illegal substitution or believing a person might pass off one good 
for another does not create liability.157 Especially in the generic drug context, 
Justice White explained it is important not to dilute the contributory trademark 
standard—which he feared the majority did—because consumers have become 
accustomed to generic drugs looking similar to their brand-name counterparts.158 
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B. Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc.: Extending Inwood to 
Service Providers 
Inwood articulated the rule regarding contributory trademark infringement for 
third parties manufacturing or distributing a product.159 Seventeen years later, 
Lockheed answered the question of whether the same standard applied to service 
providers.160 In Lockheed, the Court considered whether a domain name registrant, 
that allowed a third party to register a domain name using one of Lockheed 
Martin’s trademarks, contributorily infringed its trademark.161 The defendant, 
Network Solutions, Inc. (“NSI”), argued it did not violate the Inwood standard 
because, as a domain name registrant, it merely offered a “service” not a “product” 
as Inwood required.162 
Recognizing the Inwood standard had since broadened in subsequent cases, 
the Lockheed court reconciled the rules from two cases that held lessors of flea 
market booth spaces liable for contributory trademark infringement if they knew 
or should have known their tenants sold counterfeit or copyrighted goods.163 The 
court thereby concluded that Inwood liability applies to defendants who offer a 
“service” (e.g., leasing flea market spaces to tenants) if they have control over a 
third party’s infringing activities within the service offered.164 
In Lockheed, the Ninth Circuit decided that a third-party service provider needs 
“[d]irect control and monitoring of the instrumentality used by a third party to 
infringe the plaintiff’s mark.”165 Finding NSI was “squarely on the ‘service’ side 
of the product/service distinction,” NSI did not fall under Inwood and its 
successors’ contributory infringement umbrella.166 Therefore, there is no liability 
for a service provider under Inwood if that service provider strictly offers a service 
but has no control over the medium by infringers.167 
C. Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc.: Addressing Contributory Trademark 
Infringement for Online Marketplaces 
Equipped with the general rule from Inwood and the expansion of the rule from 
Lockheed, one can examine Tiffany, which provides the standard for contributory 
trademark infringement in the “modern” social media era.168 Subsection 1 reviews 
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the facts and procedural history of the case.169 Subsection 2 discusses the court’s 
reasoning and holding.170 
1. Facts and Procedural History 
In Tiffany, the plaintiff, a luxury jewelry company, filed an action against 
eBay, Inc. in the Southern District of New York.171 The claim was for contributory 
infringement, false advertising, and trademark dilution after Tiffany discovered a 
large amount of counterfeit Tiffany goods for sale on eBay’s site.172 eBay, an 
online marketplace, gained considerable traction among the general consumer, 
boasting more than six million new daily listings.173 Tiffany primarily argued that 
eBay was liable for contributory infringement because it knew or should have 
known its users sold counterfeit goods on its site and therefore satisfied the 
standard of liability under Inwood.174 Further, Tiffany argued eBay profited from 
the counterfeit items because eBay charged each listing an “insertion fee,” a “final 
value fee,” and a “transaction fee” if the lister used eBay’s payment processor, 
PayPal.175 A study estimated that eBay earned upwards of four million dollars 
between 2000 and 2004 from the sale of counterfeit Tiffany goods.176 Tiffany 
submitted evidence from its investigative “Buying Programs” in 2004 and 2005, 
claiming that 73%–75% of all the listings on eBay selling Tiffany goods were 
counterfeit.177 With the immediately culpable parties out of reach and as the 
amount of counterfeit Tiffany goods for sale on eBay continued to increase, 
Tiffany sought to hold eBay liable.178 
However, the court highlighted several actions eBay took to prevent the sale 
of counterfeit goods on its site, including implementing several protection policies 
and spending more than twenty million dollars on tools to bolster consumer trust 
and increase security.179 eBay also created a department with over 4,000 employees 
whose sole purpose was combatting infringement by implementing actions such as 
proactively searching for blatant counterfeit listings on the site.180 Most notably, 
eBay implemented a “notice-and-takedown system,” similar to the DMCA’s 
requirements, which gave IP owners a method for notifying eBay when they 
 
169.  Infra Subsection IV.C.I. 
170.  Infra Subsection IV.C.II. 
171.  Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 96 (2d Cir. 2010), cert denied, 562 U.S. 1082 (2010). 
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174.  Id. at 103. 
175.  Id. at 96. 
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identified infringing listings.181 
2. The Court’s Reasoning and Holding 
After presenting the relevant facts, the Second Circuit first addressed Tiffany’s 
direct infringement claim.182 Tiffany claimed eBay’s use of its trademark on its 
website was direct infringement under § 32 of the Lanham Act.183 The court set 
out a two-part test to determine if a direct trademark infringement claim exists.184 
First, a court determines whether a viable mark entitled to protection exists.185 
Second, a court considers how likely is it that the use of the mark caused consumer 
confusion regarding the “origin or sponsorship of the defendant’s goods.”186 
Applying the test, the court agreed with the district court’s decision that eBay did 
not directly infringe Tiffany’s mark.187 The court reasoned that eBay’s use of 
Tiffany’s mark was lawful since eBay used the marks to accurately describe the 
sale of genuine goods on its site.188 
The Second Circuit next addressed Tiffany’s contributory negligence claim 
against eBay.189 After adopting Lockheed’s extension of Inwood to service 
providers, the circuit court assumed the position that eBay as an OSP satisfied the 
standard because eBay exercised “sufficient control” over the counterfeit sales 
through its site.190 The Second Circuit reiterated the Inwood standard that a person 
or organization may be liable for contributory trademark infringement if it induced 
another to infringe or if it “continue[d] to supply its product to one whom it knows 
or has reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement.”191 Tiffany argued 
under the second prong of the test that eBay had “reason to know” of the 
infringement.192 Tiffany bolstered its argument pointing to the demand letters 
Tiffany sent eBay in 2003 and 2004, the findings from their Buying Programs, and 
the numerous Notice of Claimed Infringement forms Tiffany submitted to eBay.193 
eBay argued it had only “generalized knowledge” of the counterfeit sales and 
that the Inwood standard required more specific knowledge.194 eBay supported its 
argument by proposing the Second Circuit recognize that the knowledge standard 
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requires defendants to have knowledge of “identified individuals” infringing the 
product—an observation made by the Supreme Court in a subsequent copyright 
case applying Inwood.195 In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 
a copyright case concerning contributory infringement, the Supreme Court referred 
to Inwood as a narrow standard.196 The Sony court required knowledge of 
“identified individuals” to hold a defendant liable for contributory copyright 
infringement.197 
The Second Circuit adopted eBay’s position.198 In rejecting Tiffany’s proposed 
interpretation, the court reasoned Tiffany’s interpretation of the test was too broad 
and stated eBay needed “[s]ome contemporary knowledge of which particular 
listings are infringing or will infringe in the future.”199 Applying the Inwood test 
under the narrower interpretation from Sony and highlighting eBay’s efforts to 
combat counterfeit goods, the Second Circuit held Tiffany failed to present 
evidence showing eBay had more than generalized knowledge of users selling 
counterfeit Tiffany goods.200 
V. POST-TIFFANY AND BIG DATA 
Courts generally accept Tiffany and Lockheed as the standards of “knowledge” 
and “control” for finding service providers liable for contributory infringement, 
but there is still no bright-line rule because case law of one circuit is not binding 
on another circuit.201 However, it is clear that the majority of cases are very fact-
specific and leave discretion for courts to decide the amount of “specific 
knowledge” and “control” required to hold service providers liable.202 Section A 
compares Tiffany to a Ninth Circuit case where the court found a broader 
interpretation of knowledge permissible.203 Section B identifies the current 
technological capabilities of OSPs and discusses whether those capabilities should 
support a finding of knowledge by the OSPs.204 
A. Gaps in the Knowledge Requirement for Contributory Trademark 
Infringement. 
In Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akonoc Solutions, Inc. (“Akonoc”), the 
Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court’s jury verdict against Akonoc for 
 
195.  Tiffany (NJ) Inc., 600 F.3d at 108. 
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202.  Id. 
203.  Infra Section V.A. 
204.  Infra Section V.B. 
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contributory trademark infringement.205 Akonoc was a web-hosting business that 
leased server space, Internet Protocol addresses, and provided bandwidth to 
websites selling counterfeit Louis Vuitton goods.206 The Ninth Circuit concluded 
a reasonable juror could find that Akonoc had actual knowledge or reason to know 
its clients were using its services to infringe Louis Vuitton’s mark because Louis 
Vuitton sent Akonoc numerous notices informing it about the infringing 
activities.207 Since Akonoc was a service provider, Louis Vuitton also needed to 
meet the Lockheed test of “[d]irect control and monitoring of the instrumentality 
used by a third party.”208 The Ninth Circuit, agreeing with the district court, found 
Akonoc had the requisite control over the third-party infringers.209 Analogizing 
Akonoc’s service to a lessor of real estate, the court stated, “[a]ppellants had direct 
control over the ‘master switch’ that kept the websites online and available.”210 
Thus, after Akonoc and Tiffany, OSPs like Instagram and Facebook may meet the 
“control” requirement since they have the “master switch” that keeps infringing 
profiles and listings online and can remove these profiles as easily as users create 
them.211 
Yet the amount of “specific knowledge” required remains unclear.212 In 
Tiffany, the court refused to accept Tiffany’s argument that the notices provided to 
eBay constituted sufficient knowledge.213 Conversely, in Akonoc, the notices of 
infringement from Louis Vuitton were sufficient to meet the “knowledge” 
threshold for contributory trademark infringement.214 Some argue the nature of the 
service could provide an explanation.215 For example, if there are only a few sellers 
and only a few authentic products, “general knowledge” may establish 
contributory liability.216 Alternatively, if there are many sellers, “knowing their 
identities is essential” to establish liability.217 
Additionally, what seems relevant to the analysis is whether service providers 
take remedial measures similar to the actions taken by eBay in Tiffany.218 In 
Tiffany, eBay made a concerted effort to remove the infringing listings and 
implemented other corporate policies to address the problem, while the defendants 
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in Akonoc were unresponsive.219 However, the lack of a bright-line rule leaves 
uncertainty regarding how to avoid liability, resulting in varying practices amongst 
OSPs.220 Some OSPs have proactively implemented policies and procedures to 
address counterfeit items on their sites, while others—generally smaller OSPs with 
less resources—have yet to implement any such procedures.221 
B. Big Data: What do OSPs Actually Know? 
Ten years post-Tiffany, technology has significantly progressed.222 Data 
analysis and user-experience driven algorithms are the central pillars of companies 
within a particular category of OSPs—social media platforms.223 A technology 
company can leverage its data to eliminate spam accounts and eradicate 
manufactured news stories proactively; yet the belief remains that an OSP does not 
have “knowledge” until it receives reports of infringing material.224 
OSPs have successfully argued they do not have “actual knowledge” without 
notice of specific infringing content despite having the necessary data.225 Despite 
this position, OSPs can filter and eliminate spam and hate comments without 
notification from users.226 Some OSPs use facial recognition to flag and suggest 
photos in which the user may appear to that individual user.227 The average 
consumer often does not know the power of data.228 But, as the power of data 
demystifies, a gap in the Tiffany standard for holding OSPs liable for contributory 
trademark infringement presents itself.229 
Externally, the full extent of all the data points, the amount of data, or how 
large social media companies collect and store information will likely remain 
unknown.230 What these companies choose to reveal determines much of what 
society knows today, and what they currently disclose is subject to change at any 
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time at their discretion.231 Additionally, the data they collect is more than what a 
user perceives, since the data is a combination of raw data and metadata.232 For 
example, consider Twitter—a social media platform allowing users to 
communicate via short character-limited posts called “tweets.”233 When a user 
posts a tweet, the post creates a record.234 Just 4% of the record is the text in the 
tweet itself, while the remaining 96% of the record is additional data related to the 
tweet that the user may not observe, including how the tweet is stored.235 
Understanding the extent and power of social media data is a complex endeavor.236 
The lack of academic research regarding social media data highlights the tasks’ 
complexity while also contributing to the haze surrounding the extent of a social 
media company’s “knowledge”: 
 
In recent years, the explosion of social media platforms and the public 
collection of social data has brought forth a growing desire and need for 
research capabilities in the realm of social media and social data analytics. 
Research on this scale, however, requires a high level of computational 
and data-science expertise, limiting the researchers who are capable of 
undertaking social media data-driven research to those with significant 
computational expertise or those who have access to such experts as part 
of their research team.237 
 
The limited research using social media data also makes clear that a mere 
possession of data does not always provide a solution to individuals.238 Often, a 
person or computer needs to analyze the data before a company can use the data in 
any meaningful way.239 If data does require analysis to reveal its usefulness, then 
that requirement supports the OSPs’ argument that they only have generalized 
knowledge because they do not necessarily have a particular data record of 
 
231.  See id. (commenting that the information we know about social media companies is information these 
companies choose to provide); Platform Policy, INSTAGRAM, https://www.instagram.com/about/legal/terms/api/ 
(last visited Mar. 5, 2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (“We reserve the right to change 
this policy at any time without notice, so please check it regularly.”). 
232.  Leetaru, supra note 228. 
233.  Id. 
234.  Id. 
235.  Id. 
236.  Joseph T. Yun et al., The Social Media Macroscope: A Science Gateway for Research Using Social 
Media Data, 111 FUTURE GENERATION COMPUTER SYS. 819, 819 (2019) (on file with the University of the Pacific 
Law Review). 
237.  Id. 
238.  See Harness the Power of Big Data for a New Economy, IBM BIG DATA & ANALYTICS HUB, 
https://www.ibmbigdatahub.com/infographic/harness-power-big-data-new-economy (last visited Mar. 4, 2020) 
(on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (providing an infographic that describes how to leverage 
data through analytics). 
239.  See Segal, supra note 127 (depicting data as the “raw ingredients” and analytics as the “recipe” need 
to produce insightful information). 
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counterfeit goods.240 This concept of “having” versus “knowing” aligns with other 
areas of law as well that distinguish possession of information from knowledge of 
information.241 
On the other hand, OSPs analyze countless amounts of data to inform and run 
their businesses.242 Some ways OSPs use the data is by evaluating user behavior 
within the application to determine how the applications present ads to each user, 
performing internal research for future business and technical development, 
personalizing their product offerings, and more.243 Thus far, OSPs have hid behind 
a veil of ignorance.244 However, because OSPs already use data which could 
identify counterfeit sellers (e.g., location, behavior, Internet Protocol address of 
the specific user, etc.) to make internal business decisions, and since those business 
decisions are made by an employee within the company, OSPs should meet the 
knowledge requirement for contributory trademark infringement.245 
Although the technology likely exists for OSPs to easily and quickly identify 
and eradicate counterfeit items from their websites and applications, the central 
question is what liability the law should impose on an OSP versus what liability it 
can impose on OSPs.246 An OSP would argue it has no affirmative duty to 
investigate and police trademark infringing items.247 The duty to enforce one’s 
mark lies with the owner of the mark.248 Also, OSPs argue that they are unable to 
decipher the difference between counterfeit listings or postings and legitimate, 
non-infringing postings.249 If one accepts that OSPs cannot accurately differentiate 
between legitimate and non-legitimate content unless the IP owner specifically 
identifies infringement, then requiring OSPs to take a more proactive role in 
eradicating counterfeit will require technological development.250 
Writing the code to perform actions within an application is not a free 
endeavor; all technological developments come with a cost.251 To illustrate, 
 
240.  See generally Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010), cert denied, 562 U.S. 1082 
(2010) (arguing that generalized knowledge is insufficient to impose a burden on an OSP). 
241.  See CAL. PENAL CODE § 496 (West 2020) (requiring for the crime of larceny that the person 
knowingly possesses stolen property). 
242.  See Data Policy, Help Center, supra note 125 (describing how Instagram employs user data). 
243.  Id. 
244.  DANNY FRIEDMANN, TRADEMARKS AND SOCIAL MEDIA 268 (2015). 
245.  Id. 
246.  Id. at 254, 260. 
247.  STAFF OF S. FIN. COMM., 116TH CONG., THE FIGHT AGAINST FAKES: HOW STATUTORY AND 
REGULATORY BARRIERS PREVENT THE SHARING OF INFORMATION ON COUNTERFEITS app. B, Consumer 
Technology Association letter, at 4 (Comm. Print 2019). 
248.  FRIEDMANN, supra note 244, at 255. 
249.  Intellectual Property: CBP, supra note 14, at 2, 7. 
250.  See FRIEDMANN, supra note 244, at 264 (challenging the Court of Justice of the European Union’s 
decision that requiring proactive filtering would be too costly for the OSP). 
251.  See Matt Weinberger, Pinterest Has Spent $309 Million on Amazon’s Cloud Since 2017 as Part of a 
$750 Million Contract, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 22, 2019, 2:28 PM) https://www.businessinsider.com/pinterest-ipo-
amazon-web-services-2019-3 (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (detailing the cost Pinterest 
will spend on server space). 
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Business Insider reported that Pinterest, a social media site dedicated to sharing 
photo-forward content, will spend $750 million on Amazon Web Services 
(“AWS”) between May 2017 and July 2023.252 AWS is a cloud-based server 
system that many social media sites like Pinterest—and at one time Instagram—
use to host most of the website’s software and applications.253 Before switching to 
Facebook’s server center, Instagram—also a photo-focused social media site—
used thousands of machines at AWS to run its application.254 Considering 
Instagram has a higher number of users than Pinterest, with one billion active users 
as of January 2020 compared to Pinterest’s 322 million active users, the cost to run 
an application like Instagram and store its data is far greater.255 Also, not all the 
costs are solely monetary.256 Every time a website implements a new feature or 
runs a new data query, the developer must ensure the update does not adversely 
impact the website’s overall performance or a user’s experience.257 
An IP owner would argue that because of OSPs’ infrastructure, they must take 
a more proactive position in combatting the sale of counterfeit goods.258 OSPs have 
direct control over the infringing content and can “pull the plug” on the listings 
anytime.259 From a moral perspective, since OSPs benefit financially—at least 
indirectly by incorporating counterfeit sellers’ user data into their business 
decisions and directly through potential ad sales—OSPs should actively monitor 
for counterfeit listings.260 Additionally, as the source of the data, OSPs are in a 
better position than third parties to identify efficient and effective methods to 
pinpoint counterfeit goods.261 
The dichotomous wishes of these two constituents, IP owners and OSPs, led 
to the DMCA’s safe harbor provisions.262 The goal was to offer protection for 
OSPs and to ensure the internet continued to improve, while at the same time 
addressing the concern of copyright holders due to the sudden increase of 
 
252.  Id. 
253.  Id. 
254.  See Cade Metz, How Facebook Moved 20 Billion Instagram Photos Without You Noticing, WIRED 
(June 26, 2014), https://www.wired.com/2014/06/facebook-instagram/ (on file with the University of the Pacific 
Law Review) (explaining the heavy task of Instagram’s server migration to Facebook servers). 
255.  See Most Popular Social Networks Worldwide as of January 2020, Ranked by Number of Active 
Users, STATISTA (Feb. 14, 2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/272014/global-social-networks-ranked-by-
number-of-users/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (discussing client bases for both 
companies). 
256.  See Metz, supra note 254 (discussing how the server migration could not be a disruption for its users). 
257.  See Interview with Earl Damron, Director of Software Engineering, SkySlope, in Sacramento, Cal. 
(Feb. 3, 2018) (notes on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (identifying time and security risks 
as two considerations engineers must consider when developing and implementing new technology). 
258.  See FRIEDMANN, supra note 244, at 266 (proposing OSPs are in a better position to monitor for 
counterfeit goods on their sites because the content “falls within their control”). 
259.  Id. 
260.  Id. at 252, 266. 
261.  Id. at 267. 
262.  Edward J. Damich, Commentary: The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, in 4 INT’L INTELL. PROP. L. 
& POL’Y 80-1 to -2 (Hugh C. Hansen ed., 2000). 
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copyright infringement online.263 However, unlike copyright protection, 
trademarks act as a form of consumer protection, and thus it is even more necessary 
to enact similar legislation.264 
VI. TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT SAFE HARBOR 
This Comment suggests a proactive approach to addressing the increase in 
counterfeit goods available on the market.265 Enacting legislation similar to the 
DMCA, which created a safe harbor for OSPs for copyright infringement, is the 
first step in providing clarity surrounding contributory liability for OSPs and IP 
owners.266 However, a direct replica of the DMCA’s safe harbor provisions does 
not best combat the problem, so the legislation should include a few proactive 
requirements for OSPs.267 Section A discusses the DMCA provisions that the 
trademark infringement safe harbor should incorporate.268 Section B follows with 
a discussion of the European Union’s Memorandum of Understanding (“MoU”) 
between Internet Platforms and Rights Owners and why it is a valid solution to the 
counterfeit problem in the interim.269 
A. The DMCA’s Safe Harbors and Their De Facto Extension to Trademark 
Infringement 
Congress should enact a trademark infringement safe harbor for OSPs similar 
to the DMCA.270 The DMCA provides a safe harbor from secondary liability for 
copyright infringement if an OSP meets specific requirements.271 Primarily, an 
OSP is immune from secondary liability for copyright infringement if it does not 
have constructive knowledge or actual knowledge of the infringing material.272 
Even if the OSP obtains the required knowledge, an OSP is still immune from 
liability if it acts quickly to remove or prevent access to the content.273 However, 
the DMCA only shields an OSP from liability if the OSP complies with the NTD 
procedures stated in the DMCA.274 
 
263.  Id. at 80-2. 
264.  MENELL, LEMLEY & MERGES, supra note 38, at 873. 
265.  Infra Part VI. 
266.  Contra FRIEDMANN, supra note 244, at 270 (taking the opposing view that legislature should not 
enact safe harbors for OSPs). 
267.  See id. at 253 (highlighting safe harbor provisions like those in the DMCA have a passive effect on 
social media companies and encourage them to act only reactively, leading to a “flood of legal conflicts”). 
268.  Infra Section VI.A. 
269.  Infra Section VI.B. 
270.  See Calboli, supra note 19, at 211, 230 (arguing Congress should adopt safe harbor provisions 
modeling after the DMCA). 
271.  17 U.S.C.A. § 512(c)(3)(A) (West 2020). 
272.  FRIEDMANN, supra note 244, at 226. 
273.  Id. 
274.  17 U.S.C.A. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii). 
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The DMCA sets the standard for how OSPs address copyrighted material on 
their websites, but the statute is not applicable to trademark infringement; it applies 
only to copyright infringement.275 Even so, in the case of trademark infringement, 
the DMCA has “set a de facto standard in regard to notice and takedown 
procedures.”276 As such, most large OSPs utilize the same procedure for removing 
or disabling access to trademark infringing content or goods.277 Since OSPs are 
familiar with the DMCA’s NTD requirements, it would be efficient to implement 
a system for trademark infringement removal requests that the OSPs are 
comfortable with and currently use.278 
Like the DMCA, the trademark infringement safe harbor should require an 
OSP to implement NTD procedures to be free from liability.279 Responses to NTD 
requests should be within a reasonable time, taking into consideration the size and 
business model of the OSP.280 For example, a larger OSP like Instagram could 
reasonably respond to a request within twenty-four hours, while a small company 
with three employees may deserve more leeway.281 Additionally, to assist IP 
owners in enforcing their rights on the sites, the law should require OSPs to provide 
appropriate reporting to IP owners who register with the OSP and who provide the 
OSP with a list of keywords and search terms that the OSPs can use to easily run 
a report.282 An example of a compliant program is Amazon Brand Registry, which 
provides IP owners additional protective measures to enforce their marks on 
Amazon.283 
In proposing that each company implement a program similar to Amazon 
Brand Registry, the trademark infringement safe harbor contradicts the DMCA.284 
Section 512 of the DMCA prescribes that no substantial burden or cost should be 
placed on OSPs that would hinder the administration of their network and 
systems.285 Within the realm of copyright, where infringing material does not pose 
 
275.  FRIEDMANN, supra note 244, at 225. 
276.  Id. at 229. 
277.  Id. 
278.  See id. at 230 (stating OSPs have implemented DMCA-style NTD procedures for trademark holders). 
279.  See European Commission, Memorandum of Understanding on the Sale of Counterfeit Goods via the 
Internet, at 4 (June 21, 2016), https://ec.europa.eu/growth/industry/intellectual-
property/enforcement/memorandum-understanding-sale-counterfeit-goods-internet_en (on file with the 
University of the Pacific Law Review) (expressing NTDs are indispensable). 
280.  See Locker, supra note 131 (providing a statement from an Instagram representative explaining the 
company responds to most NTD requests within one day). 
281.  Id.; see also European Commission, supra note 279, at 5 (committing OSPs to take proactive steps 
that are commercially and technically reasonable given the provider’s business model). 
282.  European Commission, supra note 279, at 4. 
283.  See Benefits of Amazon Brand Registry and Protection, AMAZON, 
http://brandservices.amazon.com/benefits (last visited June 7, 2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific 
Law Review) (describing the benefits of the programs to brands who register including additional security 
protections for infringing content). 
284.  See FRIEDMANN, supra note 244, at 264 (noting the DMCA prohibits technical standards from 
imposing substantial costs). 
285.  17 U.S.C.A. § 512(i)(2)(c) (West 2020). 
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a potential health and safety risk to consumers, prescribing that the NTD 
requirements should not significantly burden the OSPs is justified.286 Yet in light 
of the risks posed to consumers especially in relation to counterfeit goods, 
imposing more burden on OSPs for trademark infringement NTDs is also 
justified.287 Furthermore, even if requiring all OSPs to develop or implement a 
program similar to Amazon Brand Registry involves technical costs for the OSPs, 
the cost is likely far less than an alternative solution requiring complete proactive 
filtering on the part of the OSP.288 
With this solution, the OSP is presenting the information to the IP owners.289 
However, the responsibility remains with the IP owner to police its mark because 
the owner still must flag the material (i.e., provide notice to the OSP) for 
removal.290 Additionally, if OSPs only must analyze a data set limited to the 
keywords and images provided by the IP owners, then the query is less demanding 
on the OSPs’ networks than a complete search of all their data.291 In conclusion, 
the trademark infringement safe harbor borrows the NTD procedures from the 
DMCA but implements an additional proactive requirement where OSPs better 
assist IP owners in monitoring their mark.292 
B. Europe’s MoU: An Example of OSPs and IP Owners Electively Working 
Together 
Congress should amend the Lanham Act or enact new legislation because a 
statute provides the most clarity for how OSPs and IP owners are to proceed.293 
Additionally, while the Tiffany rule provides direction from the courts, the rule 
does not necessarily incorporate the beliefs and preferences of all stakeholders like 
the legislative political process does.294 However, it is well known that the law 
 
286.  See FRIEDMANN, supra note 244, at 265 (suggesting OSP’s cost concerns are fictitious). 
287.  See Intellectual Property: CBP, supra note 14, at 7 (explaining some counterfeit goods pose serious 
health risks). 
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290.  Cf. id. (noting the Brand Registry requires brands to submit a report after completing a search for 
infringing material). 
291.  Interview with Earl Damron, supra note 257. 
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AGAINST FAKES: HOW STATUTORY AND REGULATORY BARRIERS PREVENT THE SHARING OF INFORMATION ON 
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293.  See Interview with Eleanor Lackman, Partner, Mitchell Silberberg & Knupp LLP SkySlope (Apr. 7, 
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University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 52 
903 
often trails advancements in technology, so amending the Lanham Act may take 
time.295 Therefore, a solution encouraging private cooperation between OSPs and 
IP owners provides an interim solution for the problem.296 
In Europe, OSPs and IP owner constituents voluntarily submitted to private 
company cooperation to combat the sale of counterfeit goods on the Internet.297 
The Commission to the European Parliament facilitated the agreement and 
encouraged dialogue between stakeholders.298 First signed in 2011, the 
Commission describes the European Union’s MoU as an industry-led initiative, 
with companies such as Facebook and Hermès signing on as recent as October 
2018.299 Stakeholders view the MoU as successful, emphasizing that the agreement 
encourages discussion between key stakeholders.300 However, IP owners still seek 
more transparency from the OSP participants, calling for the Internet Protocol 
addresses, phone numbers, emails, and even bank account details of specific 
offenders.301 This urging for more information reveals that even in a completely 
voluntary setting, OSPs actively protect their data.302 The lack of a compulsory 
requirement for OSPs to provide relevant data to IP owners is one reason why a 
regulated safe harbor provision better addresses the problem.303 On the other hand, 
the signatories recognize that NTDs do not best address the sale of counterfeit 
goods over the Internet.304 If NTDs are not the best solution to address the problem, 
then it raises the question whether a safe harbor similar to the DMCA is the best 
path forward.305 Regardless, one positive outlook from OSPs is that they believe 
the “efficiency of cooperation and bilateral relations” will continue to grow as 
 
AND REGULATORY BARRIERS PREVENT THE SHARING OF INFORMATION ON COUNTERFEITS 32 (Comm. Print 
2019) (affixing to its report letters from right holders and e-commerce platforms). 
295.  See Press Release, House Comm. on the Judiciary, Nadler, Collins, Johnson & Roby Introduce 
Bipartisan SHOP SAFE ACT to Protect Consumers and Businesses from the Sale of Dangerous Counterfeit 
Products Online (Mar. 2, 2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (calling for legislation 
because “the current legal regime does not adequately incentivize online platforms to vet who is selling on their 
website and what they are selling”). 
296.  See STAFF OF S. FIN. COMM., 116TH CONG., THE FIGHT AGAINST FAKES: HOW STATUTORY AND 
REGULATORY BARRIERS PREVENT THE SHARING OF INFORMATION ON COUNTERFEITS 5 (Comm. Print 2019) 
(including Senator Wyden’s statement noting that the federal government’s responsibility for ensuring their 
approach to counterfeit is not “stuck in the 20th century”). 
297.  European Commission, supra note 279, at 4. 
298.  European Commission, Overview of the Functioning of the Memorandum of Understanding on the 
Sale of Counterfeit Goods via the Internet, at 1, COM (2017) 707 final (Nov. 29, 2017), 
https://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/26602 (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review). 
299.  Industry-led Initiative to Fight Counterfeiting Gets New Boost, EUR. COMMISSION (Jan. 3, 2019), 
https://ec.europa.eu/growth/content/industry-led-initiative-fight-counterfeiting-gets-new-boost_en (on file with 
the University of the Pacific Law Review). 
300.  European Commission, supra note 298, at 1, 11. 
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OSPs and IP owners work together and establish methods for preventing the sale 
of counterfeit goods.306 
VII. CONCLUSION 
While many believe Tiffany v. eBay foreclosed the discussion on whether an 
OSP can be liable for contributory trademark infringement, advancements in 
technology show a weakness in the consensus that most OSPs only have 
generalized knowledge of the infringing content on their sites.307 The amount of 
data OSPs collect and use to make informed business decisions creates an 
inference that—at the very least—OSPs have actual knowledge of infringement on 
their sites.308 While it remains unclear whether OSPs can be held liable for 
contributory trademark infringement under the current standard, it is clear that both 
OSPs and IP owners agree that the sale of counterfeit goods is a real problem.309 
Although OSPs have access to a wealth of information, they are not the actual 
infringers.310 Thus, the solution must take into consideration IP owners desire to 
protect their rights without overly burdening OSPs.311 Cooperation between these 
two stakeholders is necessary to address the increased sales of counterfeit goods 
online.312 Since there are no current regulations to encourage cooperation, the hope 
is that Congress will amend the Lanham Act to enact safe harbor provisions for 
OSPs that also provide new enforcement tools for IP owners.313 
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